ცხვარიაშვილი, ქეთევან2022-02-182022-02-182021XV საფაკულტეტო სამეცნიერო კონფერენცია, თეზისები, ივლისი 5-6, 2021, გვ. 209-211/ XV Faculty Scientific Conference, Abstracts, July 5-6, 2021, pp. 209-211https://dspace.tsu.ge/handle/123456789/1220კონფერენცია მიძღვნილია აკადემიკოს კოტე წერეთლის 100 წლის იუბილესადმი/ DEDICATED TO THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF ACADEMICIAN KONSTANTINE TSERETELIUsually, moral actions and acts are placed in a rational paradigm, which on the one hand is defined by a clear knowledge of something, and on the other hand, by limited sensitivity. Passion, mood, feelings are to some extent external, not immanent, that is, separated from the inner desires of man. Ordinary abductions are usually still governed by a rational principle and are undoubtedly in obedience to a rational principle. In other cases, our so-called impulses of common sense are seen as a serious threat to a character. Whether it happens and how the “human concept”, its whims or caprices are usurped by the above-mentioned approach. The presented conference paper is about J. D. Caputo’s analysis of the “human concept”. The author himself refers to the phenomenological method of research. To analyze the phenomenology of “moral sensibility”, he invokes Kierkegaard’s “concept of pathos”, Heidegger’s “phenomenology of mood”, as well as Kant’s “sense of respect” from his moral concept. In the end, Caputo offers a phenomenological etude about the person (persona) and for him, the moral agent is the revealer of primary values. The content of Caputo’s proto-ethics is in a sense antinomianistic. A moral agent is not a person whose sensibilities and emotions are subdued, he simply has a delicate moral sensibility that is in line with the right mindset.geპროტოეთიკაპრერეფლექტურიმორალური აგენტიმორალური აგენტიგამოცდილებაProto-ethicsprereflectivemoral agentmoral sensibilityexperienceThesis