ლ. ვიტგენშტაინი ენის საზღვრების შესახებ (კრიტიკული ანალიზისათვის)

Abstract

If we divide philosophy into two branches as metaphysical philosophy, and critical philosophy, we may consider Wittgenstein to be the representative of critical philosophy. Like Kant, he speaks concerning the limits of our knowledge. It takes the form of a discussion about the limits of language. The purpose of this article is to critique some aspects of his conception. Along with him, we also ask: What can we know? Does our knowledge have limits, and where do the limits go? The answer to these questions depends on which language paradigm we use. Wittgenstein relies on the naturalistic paradigm. According to this strategy, the language is a monolayer. It includes only those propositions that are either true or false. Therefore, the main thing is whether the statements make meaning or not. According to this theory, there are limits of language, and this, on its side, means the arisen of illegitimate proposals, i.e. such assertions that don’t convey any meaning. In our view, this conception of knowledge, language, and epistemologically legitimate propositions is problematic. The trouble arises because of the use of the naturalistic paradigm, which looks as it is a characteristic feature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The solution to the problem is to take an alternative paradigm and base our theory on it. As it seems to us, such kind of paradigm is a transcendental paradigm. It gives us a more correct idea of language, knowledge, and the limit of the language, which, according to Wittgenstein, at the same time implies the limits of our knowledge. Stemming out of the transcendental strategy, we may say that our language consists not only of the propositions that are allowed by the naturalistic paradigm but, also, of those that refer to transcendental structures which don’t have worldly existence. The words and assertions about such structures deeply diff er from those about worldly things and are allowed by natural strategy. They don’t have any meaning. According to Wittgenstein, they are senseless at the same time. As it seems to us, at this point, Wittgenstein’s formulates an incorrect conception. Although words and sentences applying to transcendental structures are meaningless, this does not mean that they at the same time are senseless. This is confirmed by the fact that we easily understand and use them. We suggest that this kind of proposition that has no meaning but has sense should also be considered as an expression of knowledge.