Abstract:
Usually, moral actions and acts are placed in a rational paradigm,
which on the one hand is defined by a clear knowledge of something, and
on the other hand, by limited sensitivity. Passion, mood, feelings are to
some extent external, not immanent, that is, separated from the inner desires
of man. Ordinary abductions are usually still governed by a rational
principle and are undoubtedly in obedience to a rational principle. In other
cases, our so-called impulses of common sense are seen as a serious
threat to a character.
Whether it happens and how the “human concept”, its whims or caprices
are usurped by the above-mentioned approach. The presented conference
paper is about J. D. Caputo’s analysis of the “human concept”. The
author himself refers to the phenomenological method of research. To analyze
the phenomenology of “moral sensibility”, he invokes Kierkegaard’s
“concept of pathos”, Heidegger’s “phenomenology of mood”, as well as
Kant’s “sense of respect” from his moral concept.
In the end, Caputo offers a phenomenological etude about the person
(persona) and for him, the moral agent is the revealer of primary values.
The content of Caputo’s proto-ethics is in a sense antinomianistic. A moral
agent is not a person whose sensibilities and emotions are subdued, he
simply has a delicate moral sensibility that is in line with the right mindset.
