რუსეთის პოლიტიკა კავკასიაში XX საუკუნის 90-ან წლებში/ Russian policy in the Caucasus in the 90s of the XX century

Abstract

As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost its influence on the geopolitical space of Eurasia, which it had controlled since the 16th century. In the Caucasus, Russia lost the most important strategic region – Transcaucasia, which was under its rule for almost two hundred years. Russia's influence in the regions of the Black and Caspian Seas has significantly decreased. Russia has lost significant hydrocarbon resources. Control of global strategic communications – the world's shortest transport corridor between Europe and Asia – was also lost. In the form of Transcaucasia, Russia has lost one of the pillars of its influence on the processes of the Middle East. All this has significantly weakened Russia's influence in the North Caucasus, which is closely connected with Transcaucasia by cultural and historical ties. Also in the North Caucasus the tendencies of independence and separation from Russia were revealed with full force. These events manifested themselves already in the years of "perestroika", and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they took the form of a tendency to leave Russia and form separate state entities. Thus, the Russian political elite in the Caucasus needed to solve three main tasks: – Keeping the North Caucasus as part of Russia – Restoration of geopolitical influence in Transcaucasia – Formation of a geopolitical picture in the Middle East based on the Caucasus The unprofessionalism and total corruption of the Yeltsin regime practically precluded balanced and reasonable policy planning and execution. In fact, during the entire period of his rule, Yeltsin's regime failed to formulate a conceptually understood and time-bound foreign policy doctrine, as a result of which his efforts were reduced to restraining the ongoing processes in the Caucasus by physical force. Yeltsin's regime was unable to understand the content of these events and control their progress. Consequently, Yeltsin's government chose the easiest and at the same time the most unsuccessful way – the use of military force. As a result, the crisis of Russian politics became chronic and led to a military conflict in Chechnya. This conflict turned into a full-scale local war that put Russia on the verge of territorial disintegration. Yeltsin's regime acted similarly in Transcaucasia. Yeltsin's government countered the clearly defined European orientation of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with economic, political and military efforts. Special attention was paid to the separatism of individual regions included in these republics. As a result, political tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali escalated to a full-scale military conflict, resulting in significant human casualties and territorial losses. The foreign policy of Yeltsin's government was significantly influenced by the internal destructive processes taking place in Russia itself, which in the second half of the 1990s turned into a permanent and comprehensive crisis. These events shook the foundations of Russian statehood. However, even in such unstable conditions, the rigid foreign policy of the Yeltsin regime towards the Caucasus did not change, and no steps were taken to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. The main role in these processes was played by the mentality of both Yeltsin's closest entourage and the Russian political elite in general, which a priori excluded the concept of Transcaucasian independence and considered it as a temporarily lost Russian region. Thus, Russia's foreign policy in the Caucasus in the 1990s confirmed the permanent nature of the imperial state tradition, which remains unchanged despite changes in social formation, state structure, and historical era.